Suzanne Stern-Gillet

Plotinus' discussion of the nature and conditions of human freedom in the first six chapters of tractate VI 8 [39] has a complex historical background. While the Platonic background can be taken as read for the most part, and the Stoic sources have recently been investigated anew, the influence of Aristotle on Plotinus' thinking on voluntariness has largely gone unrecognised. Contra Aristotle, Plotinus denied that practical actions undertaken in response to external conditions in the world of sense or prompted by inner, non-rational, forces are 'under our control' or voluntary. Positing the existence of an internal relation between voluntariness and virtue, he argued that actions cannot be voluntary unless they proceed from premises and norms drawn from Intellect. Reliance on the concept of intention and the foundational distinction between primary and secondary activity enabled Plotinus to make the argument of the first six chapters of VI 8 [39] consonant with the philosophy of virtue developed elsewhere in the corpus.

Concepts of inter-personal relations are most elusive. They conceal assumptions, norms, beliefs and various associated notions, and become even more opaque and potent when they transcend the language in which they are used and come to reflect a culture or a tradition. Escaping the critical gaze of those “in” the tradition, these concepts and their theoretical baggage remain largely alien to those outside it. This gap fosters a sense of alienation, if not of exclusion, on the part of those living outside what they often regard as a charmed circle. No doubt, friendship is unlikely to figure on the danger list of such concepts. Yet, the concept is not innocent. It reflects philosophical and social presuppositions accumulated in the course of its long history and bears the weight of the paradigm shifts it underwent. This essay identifies some of these presuppositions built into it, outlines major steps in its development, and offers reasons why this particulate inter-personal relation came to be conceived the way it is conceived in “the Western tradition”.

The paper, although polemical for the most part, also presents a substantive thesis. The polemical part is directed at the claim that the Platonic Socrates held that philosophy as a practice is to be devoted to the care of self and others, and that the expression of emotion is an important aspect of the philosophic life. To undermine that claim, counter-examples from the autobiographical narrative in the Phaedo and the speeches of Diotima and Alcibiades in the Symposium are brought in. Once analysed at the required depth, those passages show that, on the contrary, Plato's Socrates remains consistently dispassionate both in his life, as he narrates it, and in the views he is made to express in the two dialogues. Rather than promoting self-expression, Socrates never ceased to warn us against misology.