Suzanne Stern-Gillet

It is often claimed in the scholarly literature that Plotinus departs from Plato in mostly dispensing with the concept of anamnēsis (recollection). The essay is aimed at disproving such a claim. The supportive argument will proceed in five stages. First, a brief outline will be given of the role that recollection plays in the Phaedrus, a dialogue to which Plotinus returns time and again. Second, a critical reading will be offered of the most salient passages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes use of the notion. Third, the function of anamnēsis, in Plotinus’ understanding of the term, will be shown to enable the embodied human soul to become aware of the presence in herself of riches she had previously been unaware of possessing, namely logoi of a reality higher than herself. Fourth, in building a normative element into the concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be argued, made it a key factor in the inward process through which human souls can reverse the self-forgetfulness that had led them to become alienated from their ontological source in Intellect. Fifth, despite having profoundly modified Plato’s concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be concluded, remained at one with him in presenting the apprehension of beauty as the stimulus most likely to lead the human soul back to her true self in Intellect.

It is often claimed in the scholarly literature that Plotinus departs from Plato in mostly dispensing with the concept of anamnēsis (recollection). The essay is aimed at disproving such a claim. The supportive argument will proceed in five stages. First, a brief outline will be given of the role that recollection plays in the Phaedrus, a dialogue to which Plotinus returns time and again. Second, a critical reading will be offered of the most salient passages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes use of the notion. Third, the function of anamnēsis, in Plotinus’ understanding of the term, will be shown to enable the embodied human soul to become aware of the presence in herself of riches she had previously been unaware of possessing, namely logoi of a reality higher than herself. Fourth, in building a normative element into the concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be argued, made it a key factor in the inward process through which human souls can reverse the self-forgetfulness that had led them to become alienated from their ontological source in Intellect. Fifth, despite having profoundly modified Plato’s concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be concluded, remained at one with him in presenting the apprehension of beauty as the stimulus most likely to lead the human soul back to her true self in Intellect.

The personality and the writings of Marsilio Ficino mark the turning point from the middleages to the Renaissance. In John Marenbon’s apt description, medieval philosophy is ‘the story of a complex tradition founded in Neoplatonism, but not simply as a continuation or development of Neoplatonism itself’ (2007: 3). ‘Not simply’ because the Enneads, the first and finest flowering of that tradition, testify to Plotinus’ deep engagement, not only with the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, but also with a variety of theologico-mystical writings of diverse middleeastern provenances, from Egypt to Persia. This complex tradition, Ficino transmitted to the West in the form of translations from Greek into Latin of the dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus as well as of several commentaries on those texts by later thinkers. In addition to such exegetical works, Ficino wrote several philosophical treatises of his own. Finally, as an ordained priest, he was also well acquainted with the writings of the Church Fathers, all of which had contributed to his belief that religion should not be separated from philosophy. To the completion of this ambitious scholarly programme and the fulfilment of his commitment to the Church, he brought the resources of his powerfully syncretistic mind. Rather than merely combining various texts and traditions, he made them speak to each other and, in the process, evolved a system that was both sui generis and attuned to the new ways of thinking that were then emerging in quattrocento Florence. His in-depth understanding of all these texts, together with his ability to spot similarities, analogies and correspondences between them, enabled him to fuse into a coherent system various elements which a modern historian of philosophy would regard as dissimilar if not incompatible. His philosophical acumen enabled him, when he thought it appropriate, to improve on the views of those he regarded as his masters and to fill whatever gaps he found in their arguments.
The present essay is an attempt to unravel the nature of Ficino’s syncretism, in which three levels of widening scope will be distinguished: authorial, trans-authorial and trans-doctrinal. To achieve a desirable level of both precision and concision, a short text will then be analysed, namely Speech Five of his most widely read treatise, a Latin commentary on Plato’s Symposium, entitled Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De Amore. It will be shown how, through the fictional speech that he put in the mouth of Marsuppini, his chosen spokesperson of the Platonic Agathon, Ficino succeeded, not only in blending Platonic, Plotinian and Christian elements in the reconstruction of an argument that Plato had meant us to regard as flawed to the core, but he also composed an elegant and original speech that continues to intrigue and enchant its readers after a gap of over six centuries.

Aristotle’s portrait of the man of great soul (ho megalopsychos) in both the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics has long perplexed commentators. Although his portrait of the man of small soul (ho mikropsychos) has been all but ignored by commentators, it, too, contains a number of claims that are profoundly counter-intuitive to the modern cast of mind. The paper is an attempt at identifying the nature of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s values and our own, and at placing the ethical claims that he makes on greatness and smallness of soul within the context of his ethics and political philosophy. The Aristotelian man of great-soul, it is here contended, is best understood as a man who assesses external and internal goods, both his own and those of others, at their true value. His overall excellence fits him to play a key political role, not only in states where the principle of distributive justice dictates that the best should rule, but also in states with a democratic constitution, in which citizens take it in turn to rule and be ruled. He is therefore paradigmatically capable of engaging in civic friendship, a relationship that Aristotle left largely undefined in spite of holding it to be a powerfully cohesive force in the state. The man of small-soul, by contrast, is best understood as a man whose disinclination to take risks of any kind makes him reluctant to contribute to the well-being of his city and who, as a result, proves incapable of engaging in civic friendship.