Suzanne Stern-Gillet

A Text Worthy of Plotinus' makes available for the first time information on the collaborative work that went into the completion of the first reliable edition of Plotinus? 'Enneads: Plotini Opera, editio maior', three volumes (Brussels, Paris, and Leiden, 1951-1973), followed by the 'editio minor', three volumes (Oxford, 1964-1983). Pride of place is given to the correspondence of the editors, Paul Henry S.J. and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, with other prominent scholars of late antiquity, amongst whom are E.R. Dodds, B.S. Page, A.H. Armstrong, and J. Igal S.J. Also included in the volume are related documents consisting in personal memoirs, course handouts and extensive biographical notices of the two editors as well as of those other scholars who contributed to fostering the revival of Plotinus in the latter half of the 20th century. Taken together, letters and documents let the reader into the problems ? codicological, exegetical, and philosophical ? that are involved in the interpretation of medieval manuscripts and their transcription for modern readers. Additional insights are provided into the nature of collaborative work involving scholars from different countries and traditions.0'A Text Worthy of Plotinus' will prove a crucial archive for generations of scholars. Those interested in the philosophy of Plotinus will find it a fount of information on his style, manner of exposition, and handling of sources. The volume will also appeal to readers interested in broader trends in 20th century scholarship in the fields of Classics, History of Ideas, Theology, and Religion.

It is often claimed in the scholarly literature that Plotinus departs from Plato in mostly dispensing with the concept of anamnēsis (recollection). The essay is aimed at disproving such a claim. The supportive argument will proceed in five stages. First, a brief outline will be given of the role that recollection plays in the Phaedrus, a dialogue to which Plotinus returns time and again. Second, a critical reading will be offered of the most salient passages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes use of the notion. Third, the function of anamnēsis, in Plotinus’ understanding of the term, will be shown to enable the embodied human soul to become aware of the presence in herself of riches she had previously been unaware of possessing, namely logoi of a reality higher than herself. Fourth, in building a normative element into the concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be argued, made it a key factor in the inward process through which human souls can reverse the self-forgetfulness that had led them to become alienated from their ontological source in Intellect. Fifth, despite having profoundly modified Plato’s concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be concluded, remained at one with him in presenting the apprehension of beauty as the stimulus most likely to lead the human soul back to her true self in Intellect.

Plotinus' discussion of the nature and conditions of human freedom in the first six chapters of tractate VI 8 [39] has a complex historical background. While the Platonic background can be taken as read for the most part, and the Stoic sources have recently been investigated anew, the influence of Aristotle on Plotinus' thinking on voluntariness has largely gone unrecognised. Contra Aristotle, Plotinus denied that practical actions undertaken in response to external conditions in the world of sense or prompted by inner, non-rational, forces are 'under our control' or voluntary. Positing the existence of an internal relation between voluntariness and virtue, he argued that actions cannot be voluntary unless they proceed from premises and norms drawn from Intellect. Reliance on the concept of intention and the foundational distinction between primary and secondary activity enabled Plotinus to make the argument of the first six chapters of VI 8 [39] consonant with the philosophy of virtue developed elsewhere in the corpus.

It is often claimed in the scholarly literature that Plotinus departs from Plato in mostly dispensing with the concept of anamnēsis (recollection). The essay is aimed at disproving such a claim. The supportive argument will proceed in five stages. First, a brief outline will be given of the role that recollection plays in the Phaedrus, a dialogue to which Plotinus returns time and again. Second, a critical reading will be offered of the most salient passages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes use of the notion. Third, the function of anamnēsis, in Plotinus’ understanding of the term, will be shown to enable the embodied human soul to become aware of the presence in herself of riches she had previously been unaware of possessing, namely logoi of a reality higher than herself. Fourth, in building a normative element into the concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be argued, made it a key factor in the inward process through which human souls can reverse the self-forgetfulness that had led them to become alienated from their ontological source in Intellect. Fifth, despite having profoundly modified Plato’s concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be concluded, remained at one with him in presenting the apprehension of beauty as the stimulus most likely to lead the human soul back to her true self in Intellect.

Concepts of inter-personal relations are most elusive. They conceal assumptions, norms, beliefs and various associated notions, and become even more opaque and potent when they transcend the language in which they are used and come to reflect a culture or a tradition. Escaping the critical gaze of those “in” the tradition, these concepts and their theoretical baggage remain largely alien to those outside it. This gap fosters a sense of alienation, if not of exclusion, on the part of those living outside what they often regard as a charmed circle. No doubt, friendship is unlikely to figure on the danger list of such concepts. Yet, the concept is not innocent. It reflects philosophical and social presuppositions accumulated in the course of its long history and bears the weight of the paradigm shifts it underwent. This essay identifies some of these presuppositions built into it, outlines major steps in its development, and offers reasons why this particulate inter-personal relation came to be conceived the way it is conceived in “the Western tradition”.

The personality and the writings of Marsilio Ficino mark the turning point from the middleages to the Renaissance. In John Marenbon’s apt description, medieval philosophy is ‘the story of a complex tradition founded in Neoplatonism, but not simply as a continuation or development of Neoplatonism itself’ (2007: 3). ‘Not simply’ because the Enneads, the first and finest flowering of that tradition, testify to Plotinus’ deep engagement, not only with the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, but also with a variety of theologico-mystical writings of diverse middleeastern provenances, from Egypt to Persia. This complex tradition, Ficino transmitted to the West in the form of translations from Greek into Latin of the dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus as well as of several commentaries on those texts by later thinkers. In addition to such exegetical works, Ficino wrote several philosophical treatises of his own. Finally, as an ordained priest, he was also well acquainted with the writings of the Church Fathers, all of which had contributed to his belief that religion should not be separated from philosophy. To the completion of this ambitious scholarly programme and the fulfilment of his commitment to the Church, he brought the resources of his powerfully syncretistic mind. Rather than merely combining various texts and traditions, he made them speak to each other and, in the process, evolved a system that was both sui generis and attuned to the new ways of thinking that were then emerging in quattrocento Florence. His in-depth understanding of all these texts, together with his ability to spot similarities, analogies and correspondences between them, enabled him to fuse into a coherent system various elements which a modern historian of philosophy would regard as dissimilar if not incompatible. His philosophical acumen enabled him, when he thought it appropriate, to improve on the views of those he regarded as his masters and to fill whatever gaps he found in their arguments.
The present essay is an attempt to unravel the nature of Ficino’s syncretism, in which three levels of widening scope will be distinguished: authorial, trans-authorial and trans-doctrinal. To achieve a desirable level of both precision and concision, a short text will then be analysed, namely Speech Five of his most widely read treatise, a Latin commentary on Plato’s Symposium, entitled Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De Amore. It will be shown how, through the fictional speech that he put in the mouth of Marsuppini, his chosen spokesperson of the Platonic Agathon, Ficino succeeded, not only in blending Platonic, Plotinian and Christian elements in the reconstruction of an argument that Plato had meant us to regard as flawed to the core, but he also composed an elegant and original speech that continues to intrigue and enchant its readers after a gap of over six centuries.