Abstract
Plotinus' discussion of the nature and conditions of human freedom in the first six chapters of tractate VI 8 [39] has a complex historical background. While the Platonic background can be taken as read for the most part, and the Stoic sources have recently been investigated anew, the influence of Aristotle on Plotinus' thinking on voluntariness has largely gone unrecognised. Contra Aristotle, Plotinus denied that practical actions undertaken in response to external conditions in the world of sense or prompted by inner, non-rational, forces are 'under our control' or voluntary. Positing the existence of an internal relation between voluntariness and virtue, he argued that actions cannot be voluntary unless they proceed from premises and norms drawn from Intellect. Reliance on the concept of intention and the foundational distinction between primary and secondary activity enabled Plotinus to make the argument of the first six chapters of VI 8 [39] consonant with the philosophy of virtue developed elsewhere in the corpus.