Abstract
Contemporary claims to self-defence increasingly rely on predictive risk assessments, algorithmic threat identification and anticipatory doctrines that stretch the temporal and evidentiary limits of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This article conceptualises these developments through the notion of retaliatory sovereignty: a juridified form of state power in which the neutralisation of emerging or speculative threats is framed as a lawful exercise of defensive force. Rather than merely expanding anticipatory self-defence, retaliatory sovereignty reshapes the legal architecture governing the use of force by transforming imminence into a flexible and technologically mediated category. Using the Israel–Iran relationship as a central case study, the article analyses practices including targeted killings, cross-border strikes, cyber operations and AI-assisted targeting. It argues that the growing reliance on anticipatory doctrines risks normalising the use of force in the absence of demonstrable imminence, raising significant challenges for the capacity of jus ad bellum to constrain contemporary security practices.