Abstract
It is often claimed in the scholarly literature that Plotinus departs from Plato in mostly dispensing with the concept of anamnēsis (recollection). The essay is aimed at disproving such a claim. The supportive argument will proceed in five stages. First, a brief outline will be given of the role that recollection plays in the Phaedrus, a dialogue to which Plotinus returns time and again. Second, a critical reading will be offered of the most salient passages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes use of the notion. Third, the function of anamnēsis, in Plotinus’ understanding of the term, will be shown to enable the embodied human soul to become aware of the presence in herself of riches she had previously been unaware of possessing, namely logoi of a reality higher than herself. Fourth, in building a normative element into the concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be argued, made it a key factor in the inward process through which human souls can reverse the self-forgetfulness that had led them to become alienated from their ontological source in Intellect. Fifth, despite having profoundly modified Plato’s concept of anamnēsis, Plotinus, it will be concluded, remained at one with him in presenting the apprehension of beauty as the stimulus most likely to lead the human soul back to her true self in Intellect.